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This paper presents an overview of recent safety 
efforts in both magnetic and inertial fusion energy.  Safety 
has been a part of fusion design and operations since the 
inception of fusion research.  Safety research and safety 
design support have been provided for a variety of 
experiments in both the magnetic and inertial fusion 
programs.  The main safety issues are reviewed, some 
recent safety highlights are discussed and the 
programmatic impacts that safety research has had are 
presented.  Future directions in the safety and 
environmental area are proposed.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The safety and environmental (S&E) advantages of 
fusion have been recognized since the earliest days of the 
US fusion program.  Over the past 25 years, the magnetic 
fusion energy (MFE) Fusion Safety Program (FSP) at the 
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory (INEEL) and the inertial fusion energy (IFE) 
safety group of the Fusion Energy Program (FEP) at 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) have 
been conducting safety research and development (R&D) 
and S&E assessments of conceptual designs to 
demonstrate the S&E potential of fusion. 
S&E research is focused on understanding the 
behavior of the largest sources of radioactive and 
hazardous materials in a fusion facility, understanding 
how energy sources in a fusion facility could mobilize 
those materials, developing integrated state of the art S&E 
computer codes and risk tools for safety assessment, and 
evaluating S&E issues associated with emerging design 
concepts in the fusion community.  Our evaluations of 
S&E issues associated with emerging IFE design concepts 
include support to the High Average Power Laser (HAPL) 
program to advance the science and technology for a dry-
wall, laser-driven IFE power plant, and collaboration with 
the Heavy Ion Fusion (HIF) and Z-Pinch programs for the 
development of alternative, thick-liquid-wall IFE 
concepts.  Recent S&E support to MFE design concepts 
includes the Advanced Power Extraction (APEX) and 
Advanced Research Innovations and Evaluation Study 
(ARIES) for both MFE and IFE, and burning plasma 
experiment designs, including preliminary studies of the 
Fusion Ignition Research Experiment (FIRE) and detailed 
safety analyses for the International Thermonuclear 
Experimental Reactor (ITER). 
Excellent progress has been made in understanding 
the nature of the S&E concerns associated with magnetic 
and inertial fusion.  This paper presents key R&D 
highlights over the past 15 years, reviews recent safety 
assessment results for both MFE (e.g., APEX, ARIES, 
FIRE, ITER) and IFE (e.g., HYLIFE-II, SOMBRERO) 
designs, and discusses impact of the results on future 
programmatic directions in the fusion program.  
II.   SOURCE TERM HAZARD 
CHARACTERIZATION 
Safety assessment generally begins with the 
determination of what hazards are present in a given 
design.  As fusion moves towards machines using tritium 
fuel and higher power levels, the hazards increase 
commensurately.  Several types of hazards are common to 
both MFE and IFE experiments and power plant designs.   
II.A  Radiological Hazards 
There are a number of radiological hazards in fusion 
experiments.1,2  The radiological release hazards dominate 
the off-site consequences for the majority of accident 
events in fusion.  Some of the principal radiological 
hazards in fusion are given in Table I.   
II.B  Chemical Hazards 
There has been a growing realization in the fusion 
safety community over the past few years that some 
fusion designs host fairly large inventories of chemically 
hazardous materials.3  While radiological concerns 
continue to dominate the public and worker risk, there are 
still important safety concerns with potential chemical 
releases.  Another concern about chemicals is that 
allowable public exposure concentrations have become 
TABLE I.  Fusion Experiment Radiological Hazards 
Specie Potential Constituents 
Fuel Tritium is naturally 
radioactive.  Hohlraums can 
also have activated 
hydrocarbons and metals. 
Activated Structural 
Materials 
Vessel wall (Fe, Cr) and 
blanket materials can 
become neutron-activated. 
Activated dust Erosion dust from plasma 
facing components (PFCs; 
Be, C, W), diagnostic 
devices (Cu), antennas (Cu), 
and other materials can be 
tritiated and activated. 
Activated coolants and 
liquids 
Some coolants (H2O, Flibe, 
Li, LiPb) and/or their 
impurities can become 
activated.  Some gaseous 
coolants can also become 
activated.  Vacuum pump 
oils can become tritiated and 
contaminated with dust. 
Activated gases Air, sulfur hexafluoride, and 
nitrogen in MFE and IFE; 
some IFE designs can also 
have xenon and fluorine.  
more strict in the past two decades, much more so than 
radiation exposure limits.  In some cases, the restrictive 
limits for chemical exposure have resulted in chemical 
exposures being as consequential as radiological 
exposures.4,5  The chemical hazards include use of in-
vessel beryllium and other less toxic materials, such as 
tungsten, copper, and carbon; these dusts pose varying 
health threats.  An IFE design may have all of these 
material concerns and the added concerns of hohlraum 
material debris in the reaction chamber.  IFE also has the 
concerns of target manufacture, where dusts can be 
created, potentially containing lead, beryllium, mercury, 
or other materials. 
III.  ENERGY SOURCE EVALUATIONS 
The energy sources that can breach confinement 
boundaries or otherwise mobilize hazardous materials 
must also be understood and characterized in normal 
operation and off-normal events to gain a complete, 
accurate, and balanced safety profile for the facility.   
•Chemical energy.  An important energy source in fusion 
facilities is oxidation of heated fusion materials with air 
or steam.  INEEL tests have shown that after materials 
oxidize, the oxides tend to volatilize and form aerosols 
which are easily mobilized by flowing gas.6,7  Both MFE 
and IFE designs have required safety calculations for 
material oxidation, including carbon-fiber composite tiles 
that can release absorbed elemental tritium when 
oxidized.  We also note that beryllium compounds, such 
as BeO, are carcinogenic like the elemental metal.  Dust 
generated in experiments is also chemically reactive. 
•Electrical energy.  The stored electrical energy in 
superconducting magnets is a large energy source for 
MFE.  MFE magnet faults have been postulated to lead to 
electrical arcs that can damage confinement barriers such 
as the vacuum vessel or the cryostat. Some IFE designs 
using particle beams for fuel compression and heating 
may have stored electrical energy in the beam and 
steering magnets, but not nearly the magnitude as found 
in MFE.   
•Thermal energy.  Without proper cooling, the thermal 
energy in the structures of a fusion experiment due to 
activation product decay heating, plasma heat generation 
and the heat from plasma heating systems can result in 
mobilization of the activated material in the structures.   
•Pressure energy.  Pressurized coolants and compressed 
gases are used in both MFE and IFE designs.  Coolants 
may change phase when released and can threaten the 
confinement boundaries.  Both IFE and MFE experiments 
have large vacuum reservoirs that can suffer a breach; 
perhaps a port window failure, a valve leak, etc.  IFE also 
has the safety issue of compressing tritium gas to high 
pressure to fill target pellets.   
•Radiation energy.  Ionizing radiation from tritium fuel 
and from neutron activated materials pose worker, public, 
and environmental hazards.  Non-ionizing radiation also 
poses hazards.  In IFE, lasers can be used to ignite the 
fuel, using very high energy pulses for short times.  MFE 
may use lasers for diagnostics.  The laser energy is much 
less than for IFE, but can be sufficient energy to raise 
micron size dust to ignition temperature in air.    
IV. SAFETY ASSESSMENT TOOL 
DEVELOPMENT 
A number of experiments have been performed and a 
variety of tools have been developed to characterize the 
hazardous materials and the energies that can mobilize 
them.  The experiments have focused on the safety of 
materials, including chemical reactivity of fusion 
materials, tritium uptake and release from plasma facing 
components (PFCs), and release, volatilization, and 
mobilization from oxidized fusion structural materials.  
Table II lists the materials that have been tested at the
INEEL over the past decade for high temperature 
exposure to steam from coolant and ingress air.  These 
data have been incorporated into accident analyses to 
estimate the amounts of radiological and toxicological 
TABLE II.  Material Safety Tests Performed by the INEEL Fusion Safety Program 
Material Environment 
Oxidation 
temperature range 
(C)
Mobilization 
measurements 
performed 
Ion implantation tests 
performed 
Steels 
PCA steel,  
solid disk 
air, steam 600-1300 yes yes 
Austenitic stainless steel, 
solid disk 
air, steam 500-1200 yes yes 
Ferritic steel  
HT-9, solid disk 
air, steam 600-1400 yes yes 
Refractories 
Niobium alloy, 
solid disk 
air, steam 800-1200 yes  
Tantalum, 
solid disk 
air 500-1200   
Molybdenum TZM alloy, 
solid disk 
air 400-800 yes  
Inconel, solid disk air 800-1200 yes  
Tungsten, foil    yes 
Tungsten alloy, 
solid disk 
air, steam 600-1200 yes  
Tungsten, 
plasma sprayed disk 
steam 800-1200 yes yes 
Tungsten brush, 
3.2-mm diameter rods 
steam 500-1100 yes  
Tungsten carbide, disk    yes 
Vanadium alloy  
V-15Cr-5Ti, solid disk 
air 600-1200 yes yes 
Beryllium 
Beryllium, 
0.2- and 2-mm diameter 
pebbles 
steam 350-900   
Beryllium,  
14 - 31 micron powder 
steam 300-500   
Beryllium,  
solid rods 
steam 400-600 yes  
Beryllium,  
plasma sprayed 
steam 400-600 yes  
Beryllium,  
88% dense disk 
steam 400-600 yes  
Irradiated beryllium, 
solid rods 
steam 400-700 yes  
Pure beryllium foil and 
carbon-coated Be foil 
   yes 
Graphites 
Graphite,  
solid disk 
steam 1000-1700   
Graphite,  
solid disk 
air 800-1800   
Carbon fiber composite,  
solid disk 
air 525-1000 yes  
Amorphous carbon film    yes 
Copper alloys 
Copper alloy, solid disk air, steam 600-1200 yes  
CuCrZr alloy, disk    yes 
Cu-OFHC, disk    yes 
Cu/Be, disk    yes 
W-coated copper, disk    yes 
releases that could occur in postulated accident scenarios. 
 In recent years as fusion designs have evolved to 
contain greater detail, the US Fusion Program has 
dedicated greater resources to the development and 
implementation of state-of-the-art methodologies for S&E 
analyses.  In some cases, this required improving or 
upgrading similar fission safety codes for fusion 
conditions.  In other cases, it required development of 
fusion-specific codes.  The set of tools for IFE has been 
described in detail8 and currently includes neutron 
transport and activation calculations, heat transfer, 
thermal-hydraulics and aerosol transport simulations, and 
finally, accident consequence analysis and 
radiological/toxicological dose evaluation.  MFE and IFE 
tools are very similar. 
IFE radionuclide inventories are calculated using 
particle transport and activation methodologies.  Fusion 
safety analyses typically use Monte Carlo codes, such as 
TART,9 to calculate the neutron and/or photon transport 
within the power plant components. TART has 
traditionally been used by the LLNL FEP to develop 
detailed 3-D neutronics models such as that shown in 
Fig. 1.  The Monte Carlo method is applied to determine 
energy-dependent particle path-lengths in the regions of 
interest.  The activation code ACAB10 can use 3-D 
neutron fluxes generated by Monte Carlo neutron 
transport codes such as TART, allowing for inventory 
calculation within complex geometries.  The code has the 
ability to simulate realistic operational scenarios of very 
different nuclear systems.  It can provide a very accurate 
and efficient modeling of the pulsed schedule for inertial 
fusion experimental facilities, such as the National 
Ignition Facility (NIF).  The MFE safety program relies 
on neutronics work by the University of Wisconsin-
Madison researchers to support safety and waste disposal 
analyses for design activities.  Examples of this work 
include FIRE,11 ARIES-AT,12 and ARIES-IFE.13  The 
MFE approach is to use the MCNP code or the 
ONEDANT particle transport module in DANTSYS,14
and activation analysis is performed using the DKR-
PULSAR code15 or, more recently, the ALARA pulsed 
activation code.16  The FENDL-2 nuclear evaluated data 
set17 is used in both cases.   
Oxidation-driven mobilization experiments outlined 
in Table II have produced data that has allowed better 
estimation of radionuclide release fractions during 
accident conditions.  These data have been used with the 
heat transfer capability of the CHEMCON code18 to 
obtain radioactivity source terms during accident 
scenarios in both IFE and MFE.  CHEMCON was 
developed by the INEEL FSP to analyze thermal 
transients and has been updated to account for new 
experimental data and a more realistic oxidation package.8
Fig. 1. Cross section of the TART computer model for the 
SOMBRERO IFE power plant design.19,20
Once the radioactive source term is known, the 
MELCOR thermal-hydraulics code21 is used to simulate a 
wide range of physical phenomena including heat 
transfer, dust and aerosol physics, and fusion product 
release and transport.  MELCOR was originally 
developed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) to treat 
severe accident phenomena in boiling and pressurized 
fission reactors.  Since 1995, the INEEL has performed a 
continuous development effort to adapt MELCOR to 
fusion safety studies.22
MFE S&E uses a code for predicting electric arc 
damage from the unmitigated quench of a 
superconducting magnet.  The code is called MAGARC 
and it uses 3-D heat conduction equations and a resistive 
circuit network to account for the arcing, bypass currents, 
magnet melting, and heat conduction.23  Another code of 
importance in both MFE and IFE safety is the TMAP 
code that calculates tritium migration through materials 
such as in-vessel cooling tube walls and heat exchanger 
tubes.  The most recent version of TMAP has been 
validated and verified.24
Finally, radiological dose conversion factors (DCFs) 
are used to translate the activity levels present in the 
environment (obtained from MELCOR) to an equivalent 
dose to humans.  As a result of the collaboration between 
the LLNL FEP and our international colleagues in 
UNED/Instituto de Fusion Nuclear, in Madrid, Spain, the 
traditional fission DCF libraries have been expanded to 
include specific IFE radionuclides relevant for fusion25
and these updated libraries have been used for a realistic 
assessment of radiological doses.  The INEEL FSP 
researchers collaborated with SNL in the early 1990’s to 
upgrade the MACCS computer code.  MFE developed a 
food chain model26 for use in MACCS2, and the MACCS 
developers included all DOE DCFs in MACCS2.27  Use 
of the codes described above allows for calculation of 
accident consequences and evaluation of radioactive 
hazards from a fusion power plant.  As mentioned 
previously, chemical hazards must also be considered to 
provide a complete safety assessment for fusion power 
plants.  Fusion safety researchers have included chemical 
toxicity assessments as part of the overall safety analyses, 
using atmospheric dispersion simulations to estimate the 
time-averaged peak concentrations resulting from 
accidental releases.4,28
Parallel to the traditional deterministic safety analysis 
approach described above, MFE and IFE safety 
researchers have also developed methodologies for 
probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) of fusion facilities.  
The traditional, deterministic safety analysis approach is 
important for bounding the worst consequences for 
facility acceptance and emergency planning.  However, 
PSA treats small consequence events that have a 
reasonably high likelihood of occurrence, and therefore 
require attention by designers because such events must 
be appropriately mitigated to demonstrate good control 
and stewardship of a facility.  A variety of PSA initiating 
event identification techniques have been used thus far in 
both MFE and IFE fusion designs.29,30
V.  RECENT S&E EVALUATIONS AND FINDINGS 
MFE safety assessment work was recently performed 
for the FIRE design. During the FIRE design activity, 
safety researchers noted that the DOE had published some 
emergency evacuation guidance after the fusion safety 
standard.  The fusion safety standards31,32 directed using 
the then-current practice of using best estimate 
radiological dispersion calculations to give a realistic 
estimate of the radiological dose for probabilistic safety 
assessment.  Then, DOE emergency planning guidance 
was published that directed usage of conservative weather 
conditions to define the largest area that would require 
evacuation due to a large release event.  Therefore, to 
meet the DOE emergency planning guidance and avoid 
the need for an evacuation plan, conservative weather 
calculations must be used and the results must show that 
off-site doses are small.  This interpretation of the DOE 
emergency management guidance caused a safety limit of 
13 g of releasable tritium to be placed on FIRE systems.33
Another important safety result for FIRE was the 
erosion damage expected from Edge Localized Modes 
(ELMs) in advanced tokamak operation.  The ELMs 
posed a serious divertor material erosion threat due to the 
rapid pulsed heating bursts on the tungsten divertor 
surface.  There are few data in the literature about 
tungsten dust explosibility, but in general the smaller the 
dust size, the more energetic the deflagration event, and 
the tungsten dust produced is expected to be small like 
other tokamak dusts, < 10 microns.34  This ELM issue is 
being addressed by existing machines to learn how to 
recognize inception of an ELM and how to control ELMs 
to reduce divertor damage, such as sweeping the ELM 
bursts to diffuse the heating.35   
 In the past few years IFE safety researchers have 
completed safety assessments for two IFE power plant 
designs and an IFE target fabrication facility.19,36-38  The 
results from these analyses show that the dominant dose 
comes from the tritium in HTO form.  Assuming typical 
weather conditions, total off-site doses below the 10-mSv 
evaluation guideline established by the DOE Fusion 
Safety Standards31,32 seem to be achievable.  It has been 
found that if conservative weather conditions were used in 
calculations, the off-site doses would result in an order of 
magnitude higher dose.  In that case, design changes and 
further analysis would be needed to meet the safety 
requirements.  In the case of an accident in the target 
fabrication facility, the total plant tritium inventory is not 
an issue, only the segmented portion of the inventory that 
is vulnerable to release is important.  If designs for target 
fabrication facilities can ensure that canisters/fill rooms 
remain isolated from each other during an accident, then 
this segmentation will help meet the safety goals.38
The APEX study has proposed molten salt-cooled 
solid wall and liquid wall MFE fusion designs.  An 
analysis was recently completed for two of these designs, 
a Flibe cooled solid first wall and a Flinabe cooled liquid 
first wall design.  Both designs used ferritic steel as the 
structural material.5  The results for loss of coolant 
accidents showed that the peak blanket temperatures 
remained below values where structural integrity would 
be lost, provided that natural convection in the vacuum 
vessel cooling system was initiated.  An interesting result 
was that the Flinabe liquid wall design experienced high 
temperatures in a loss of flow scenario; because of the 
decay of Na-22 and Na-24 within the coolant itself.  A 
passive drain tank was proposed to gravity flow the 
Flinabe away from the blanket in loss of flow situations.  
The ARIES-AT self-cooled LiPb design shared similar 
results.39  Activation of the coolant in terms of decay heat 
and radiological dose is important in low activation, self-
cooled breeder designs. 
Chemical toxicity assessments were conducted for 
two candidate IFE target materials (Hg and Pb) and for 
the beryllium present in the molten salt Flibe.4,28  For 
these materials it was found that the chemical toxicity was 
the dominant public safety concern.  Results from these 
studies show that it is crucial to address chemical hazards 
for a complete safety assessment for fusion power plants. 
A Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis procedure for 
activation calculations has been developed based on 
simultaneous random sampling of all the cross sections 
involved in a problem, and it has been implemented in the 
activation code ACAB.40  This work has been performed 
in collaboration with UNED/Instituto de Fusion Nuclear 
in Madrid, Spain.  Using the procedure, it is possible to 
propagate activation cross section uncertainties forward to 
provide uncertainties on the overall radionuclide activities 
and any activity-based radiological results.  Ultimately, 
this capability will be used to identify nuclear reactions 
that are both important to the desired results and have 
relatively large uncertainties.  It is hoped that this will 
help drive experiments to perform more precise 
measurements of critical activation cross sections.  
Regarding environmental studies, previous work has 
traditionally used the waste disposal ratings (WDRs) as 
defined in 10CFR61, but updated for fusion radionuclides 
by Fetter,32 as a waste disposal index in order to 
determine if a particular component qualifies for shallow 
land burial disposal.  However, this may not be the best 
waste management option if one has to dispose of 
relatively large volumes.  The IAEA has proposed 
concentration levels of radionuclides in solid materials 
below which the materials may be released on the 
grounds that the associated radiation hazards are trivial.41
Some recent MFE work in low activation materials 
(LAMs) has determined that a combined strategy can be 
used to attain the goal of no high level waste for fusion.  
Analysis has shown that, for low power density machines, 
a combined strategy of specific LAM usage and shielding 
allows the outboard fusion vacuum vessel and all magnets 
to be cleared or recycled, and also that adequate shielding 
allows the activated material that cannot be cleared to be 
disposed of as low level waste.42  By contrast, for 
compact machines, with high power density and high 
neutron wall loading, the overall volume of activated 
material is much smaller than in low power density 
machines.  However, although all components can be 
classified as low level waste, neither the in-vessel 
components nor the magnets can be cleared even after an 
extended storage time of 100 years.43  Thus, these 
machine optimization strategies lead to different 
outcomes in terms of the proposed disposition of activated 
material.  In parallel to the MFE effort, IFE safety 
researchers have studied whether the components of an 
IFE fusion energy power plant could be cleared or 
relinquished from regulatory control.  Waste management 
studies for the HYLIFE-II IFE design show that in the 
case of the confinement building, which dominates the 
total volume of the waste stream, clearance would be 
possible after about one year of cooling following the 
shutdown of the plant.44
VI.  PROGRAMMATIC IMPACTS OF SAFETY 
 The US Fusion Safety Program activities have had 
impact in diverse domestic and international MFE and 
IFE projects.   
 Within the scope of the ARIES program, safety 
personnel have traditionally been involved in the ARIES 
team for design studies of fusion energy by providing 
input on design windows for IFE concepts.  IFE designs 
have also benefited from S&E findings from the recent 
ARIES-IFE study, such as the updated assessment of the 
choice of chamber structural material for a liquid wall 
chamber concept.45  In addition to the original choice of 
stainless steel 304, other alternate materials were 
considered.  Since then, the activation behaviour of the 
different steels considered in ARIES has been explored in 
order to determine if they are acceptable options from a 
waste management perspective.  These S&E studies have 
shown that, if niobium and molybdenum impurities are 
significantly reduced, SS 304 is acceptable.  However, 
oxide-dispersion-strengthened (ODS) low activation 
ferritic steel could be a more promising option given the 
potential for high temperature operation.40,45,46
 The High Average Power Laser (HAPL) Program 
currently leads laser facility studies for inertial fusion 
energy.  Since the beginning of the program’s activities 
the LLNL FEP has provided expert input in the areas of 
S&E.  Chamber material selection for laser IFE has taken 
into account safety results from the SOMBRERO design 
accident assessment.19  Recent oxidation data of carbon 
fiber composite structures47 has been studied within the 
scope of the HAPL program and S&E experts continue to 
provide guidance on radiation effects for alternative first 
wall candidates such as tungsten and ferritic steel.  Such 
radiation effects studies include activation assessments 
and also x-ray irradiation experiments and simulations to 
help predict material ablation and first wall lifetime.48
The LLNL’s FEP S&E personnel have traditionally 
been largely involved with the NIF neutronics effort.  The 
main goal of that group is the assessment of activation 
issues such as NIF radiation doses to workers and 
components.  In particular, the expertise developed for 
IFE neutronics has been very synergistic with the need for 
detailed 3-D models for NIF.  The effort in this area has 
supported the NIF Final Safety Analysis Report as well as 
the Environmental Impact Statement. 
The US ITER Test Blanket Module (TBM) group is 
responsible for designing potential candidate breeding 
blanket modules that the participants may place in ITER 
testing ports.  Ongoing work by fusion safety experts is 
providing safety assessments for the ITER TBM design 
options.  Work developed to-date in this area consists of 
heat transport calculations with the CHEMCON code in 
order to simulate temperature excursions in first wall and 
blanket components during loss-of-flow and loss-of-
cooling accident scenarios.  Future work will involve 
complete safety assessments including MELCOR models 
for the TBM and ancillary systems. 
VII.  FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Over the past 15 years, safety analyses for MFE 
systems, especially ITER, have matured significantly.  
The behavior of the tokamak system with respect to 
public safety is better understood than ever before.  
Uncertainties still remain but they have been identified 
and research is in place to reduce them to the extent 
practical.  Much of the future work for ITER is to support 
regulatory approval.49 Code development, and code 
verification and validation work must be performed to 
support ITER regulatory approval because these code 
results are used to assure public safety.  In addition, 
validation of the safety limits that have been placed on 
erosion dust created from, and tritium uptake in, the W, C, 
and Be plasma facing materials used in ITER is required.  
It is anticipated that further R&D can help validate these 
safety limits but only ITER operations will yield answers 
to dust generation and tritium uptake definitive enough to 
convince regulators.  Furthermore, regulators will likely 
use a graduated licensing approach, such as was used at 
JET for the preliminary tritium experiment and the 
deuterium tritium experiment campaigns.50  Licensing 
ITER for each operating stage will help regulators to gain 
confidence in the behavior of the facility, and the 
operating experience results from each stage will provide 
data useful to benchmark the safety limits and 
assumptions for the following stage.  The US fusion 
safety program will also support the US design effort on 
potential ITER TBMs. 
Some fusion facilities, such as JET and TFTR,50,51
have made good use of PSA in making their cases for 
licensing tritium usage, and ITER has also combined the 
traditional deterministic or ‘worst case’ safety analysis 
with probabilistic methods to provide a complete 
spectrum of potential accident scenarios.  Ultimately how 
ITER is sited and what safety approaches are used to 
document public safety will set a precedent for the future 
regulatory approach and framework for tokamaks and 
other fusion facilities.   
Beyond public radiological safety, continued 
cognizance of chemical safety issues and how chemical 
safety is approached in the DOE, particularly for 
remediation workers and the public, and waste 
management is important to ensure that fusion designs 
can respond appropriately to changes in regulations in this 
area.  Of particular importance for fusion given its size is 
how the DOE site wastes are remediated and what, if any, 
changes occur to the definition of low level waste and, in 
particular, the definition of clearance of materials for 
recycling back into processes or for free release.  In much 
of the previous work for both magnetic and inertial fusion 
studies, a great deal of effort has been expended in an 
attempt to avoid the generation of high-level waste.  The 
ARIES project has used the avoidance of high-level waste 
as a design requirement,52 based on interaction and advice 
from US electrical utilities and industries.  It is not clear 
that the public understands or appreciates the differences 
between low level waste that meets 10CFR61.55 Class C 
requirements versus high level waste that exceeds these 
requirements.42,53  As a result, the choice between 
generation of small quantities of high-level waste versus 
large quantities of low-level waste is a difficult one 
worthy of community discussion and debate.  This 
discussion must occur in the context of overall machine 
design optimization strategies, physics and technology 
design assumptions, and the evolving political climate 
surrounding waste disposal.  The ultimate approach 
adopted in the future will be influenced by the nature of 
these constraints and could differ country by country.43
Both MFE and IFE safety requires further 
examination of occupational safety, not merely 
radiological safety but all aspects of safety in operating 
and maintaining the experiments.  Occupational safety 
requires the level of design detail found in NIF, ITER, or 
existing experiments such as JET, to support 
identification of the hazards that workers are exposed to 
in facility rooms and areas.  Once again, the operating 
experiences from such machines will provide valuable 
data on occupational safety.  Such information will allow 
identification of the most important or sensitive issues for 
worker safety. 
From the IFE safety perspective, more work is 
recommended on estimation of accidental releases and 
occupational exposures to assess realistic air 
concentrations for the workers and the public.  More 
sophisticated models for accident analyses should account 
for chemical reactivity with other compounds existing in 
experiment, power plant, and target fabrication facility 
atmospheres.  Implementation of safety features, such as 
segregation of inventories and additional levels of 
confinement, are essential to minimize potential 
radioactive and chemical exposures.  Because micron 
scale dust is created and can accumulate in regions of 
vessels where it can easily be mobilized, the dust must be 
studied for its mobilization and hazards.54  IFE 
researchers plan to continue studying potential 
coolant/chamber/target materials in order to optimize the 
S&E characteristics of fusion power plant designs.  Safety 
codes will be updated as needed to account for new 
materials, and code libraries will be expanded accordingly 
to account for updated mobilization and/or radiological 
data.  Cross section uncertainty analyses will be used to 
identify nuclear reactions that significantly contribute to 
uncertainty of activation results in a fusion environment.  
These studies will help drive experiments for a more 
accurate estimation of critical reaction cross sections. 
The US FSP is also very active in the International 
Energy Agency’s (IEA’s) Implementing Agreement on 
the Economic, Safety, and Environmental Aspects of 
Fusion Power.  US safety personnel are active in all 
safety-related task areas. The US FSP is also active in the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) 
technical meetings on fusion safety, where safety 
professionals meet every few years to present progress 
and exchange ideas. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This work was prepared for the US Department of 
Energy, Office of Fusion Energy Sciences, under the 
DOE Idaho Field Office contract number DE-AC07-
99ID13727 and the University of California, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory contract number W-7405-
Eng-48.  
REFERENCES 
1. J. RAEDER, Controlled Nuclear Fusion: 
Fundamentals of Its Utilization for Energy Supply,
John Wiley & Sons, New York (1986). 
2. Energy from Inertial Fusion, International Atomic 
Energy Agency, Vienna, chapter 6 (1995). 
3. L. C. CADWALLADER, “Chemical Hazards and 
Safety Issues in Fusion Safety Design,” Fusion 
Science and Technology, 44, 369 (2003). 
4. S. REYES, J. F. LATKOWSKI, L. C. 
CADWALLADER, R. W. MOIR, J. GOMEZ DEL 
RIO, and J. SANZ, “Safety Issues of Hg and Pb as 
IFE Target Materials: Radiological versus Chemical 
Toxicity,” Fusion Science and Technology, 44, 400 
(2003). 
5. B. J. MERRILL, M. SAWAN, C. P. C. WONG, R. E. 
NYGREN, L. C. CADWALLADER, S. MALANG, 
and D.-K. SZE, “Safety assessment of two advanced 
ferritic steel molten salt blanket design concepts,” 
Fusion Engineering and Design, 72, 277 (2004). 
6. G. R. SMOLIK, K. A. McCARTHY, and V. L. 
SMITH-WACKERLE, “Characterization of Oxide 
Breakup by Convective Currents,” Proceedings of the 
15th Symposium on Fusion Engineering, October 11-
15, 1993, Hyannis, MA, IEEE, 923 (1993). 
7. D. L. HAGRMAN, G. R. SMOLIK, K. A. 
McCARTHY, and D. A. PETTI, “Volatilization from 
PCA Steel Alloy,” Fusion Technology, 30, 1442 
(1996). 
8. S. REYES, J. F. LATKOWSKI, J. SANZ, and 
J. GOMEZ DEL RIO, “Safety Assessment for 
Inertial Fusion Energy Power Plants: Methodology 
and Application to the Analysis of the HYLIFE-II 
and SOMBRERO Conceptual Designs,” Journal of 
Fusion Energy, 20, 23 (2001). 
9. D. E. CULLEN, Users Manual for TART2002: A 
Coupled Neutron-Photon, 3-D, Combinatorial 
Geometry, Time Dependent, Monte Carlo Transport 
Code, UCRL-ID-126455, Revision 4, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory (2003). 
10. J. SANZ, ACAB98: Activation Code for Fusion 
Applications. User's Manual V4.0, UCRL-CR-
133040, Universidad Nacional de Educacion a 
Distancia (UNED) and Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (1999). 
11. M. E. SAWAN, H. Y. KHATER, and S. J. ZINKLE, 
“Nuclear Features of the Fusion Ignition Research 
Experiment (FIRE),” Fusion Engineering and 
Design, 63-64, 547 (2002). 
12. D. HENDERSON, L. EL-GUEBALY, P. WILSON, 
A. ABDOU and the ARIES TEAM, “Activation, 
Decay Heat, and Waste Disposal Analyses for the 
ARIES-AT Power Plant,” Fusion Technology, 39,
444 (2001). 
13. L. A. EL-GUEBALY, D. L. HENDERSON, P. P. H. 
WILSON, A. E. ABDOU and the ARIES TEAM, 
“Target Activation and Radiological Response of 
ARIES-IFE dry wall chamber,” Fusion Engineering 
and Design, 63-64, 653 (2002). 
14. R. E. ALCOUFFE et al., DANTSYS 3.0, One-, Two- 
and Three-dimensional multigroup discrete ordinates 
transport code system, RSICC computer code 
collection CCC-547, submitted by Los Alamos 
National Laboratory (1995). 
15. M. J. SISOLAK, Q. WANG, H. KHATER, and D. 
HENDERSON, DKR-PULSAR 2.0, a radioactivity 
calculation code that includes pulsed/intermittent 
operation, UWFDM-1250, University of Wisconsin 
Fusion Technology Institute, Madison WI (2004). 
16. P. P. H. WILSON and D. L. HENDERSON, ALARA: 
Analytic and Laplacian Adaptive Radioactivity 
Analysis, Volume 1, Technical Manual, UWFDM-
1070, University of Wisconsin Fusion Technology 
Institute, Madison WI (1998). 
17. A. PASHCHENKO et al., FENDL/A-2.0: Neutron 
activation cross-section data library for fusion 
applications, INDC(NDS)-173, IAEA Nuclear Data 
Section (1997). 
18. M. J. GAETA and B. J. MERRILL, CHEMCON 
User's Manual Version 3.1, INEL-95/0147, Idaho 
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory 
(1995). 
19. S. REYES, J. F. LATKOWSKI, J. GOMEZ DEL 
RIO, and J. SANZ, "Accident Dose Analysis of the 
SOMBRERO Inertial Fusion Energy Power Plant 
Design", Fusion Technology, 39, 941 (2001). 
20. Osiris and SOMBRERO Inertial Confinement Fusion 
Power Plant Designs, DOE/ER/54100-1 and 
DOE/ER/54100-2, by W. J. Shafer Associates et al., 
US Department of Energy (1992). 
21. R. O. GAUNTT et al., MELCOR Computer Code 
Manuals, NUREG/CR-6119, Volume 1, Revision 1, 
SAND97-2398, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(1997). 
22. B. J. MERRILL, R. L. MOORE, S. T. 
POLKINGHORNE, and D. A. PETTI, 
“Modifications to the MELCOR Code for 
Application in Fusion Accident Analyses,” Fusion 
Engineering and Design, 51-52, 555 (2000). 
23. B. J. MERRILL, “Modeling and Unmitigated Quench 
Event in an ITER Toroidal Field Magnet,” Fusion 
Technology, 37, 231 (2000). 
24. G. R. LONGHURST and R. AMBROSEK, 
“Verification and Validation of TMAP7,” presented 
at the 7th International Conference on Tritium 
Science and Technology, Baden-Baden, Germany, 
September 12-17, 2004. 
25. J. GOMEZ DEL RIO, J. SANZ, S. REYES, and J. F. 
LATKOWSKI, "Parametric Study of Accident 
Consequences from Different Weather Conditions. 
Application to IFE Power Plants", Fusion 
Technology, 39, 1008 (2001). 
26. M. L. ABBOTT and A. S. ROOD, “COMIDA: A 
Radionuclide Food Chain Model for Acute Fallout 
Deposition,” Health Physics, 66, 17 (1994). 
27. M. YOUNG and D. CHANIN, “MACCS2 
Development and Verification Efforts,” SAND-97-
0561C, NRC International MACCS2 User’s Group 
Meeting, September 16-19, 1996, Portoroz, Slovenia, 
Sandia National Laboratories (1996). 
28. S. REYES, L. C. CADWALLADER, J. GOMEZ 
DEL RIO, J. F. LATKOWSKI, and J. SANZ, “Safety 
Issues of Beryllium Use in IFE Power Plants,” 
Proceedings of the 20th IEEE/NPSS Symposium on 
Fusion Engineering (SOFE), October 14 - 17, 2003, 
San Diego, California, IEEE, 260 (2003). 
29. L. C. CADWALLADER, "Identification and 
Selection of Initiating Events for Experimental 
Fusion Facilities", Proceedings of the 13th 
Symposium on Fusion Engineering, Knoxville, 
Tennessee, October 2-6, 1989, IEEE, 1103 (1989). 
30. L. C. CADWALLADER and J. F. LATKOWSKI, 
Preliminary Identification of Accident Initiating 
Events for Inertial Fusion Energy Power Plant 
Designs, INEEL/EXT-01-01600, Idaho National 
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (2003). 
31. Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities – Requirements,
DOE-STD-6002-96, U. S. Department of Energy, 
Washington, DC (1996). 
32. Safety of Magnetic Fusion Facilities – Guidance,
DOE-STD-6003-96, U. S. Department of Energy, 
Washington, DC (1996). 
33. L. C. CADWALLADER and D. A. PETTI, “Safety 
in the Design of Three Burning Plasma 
Experiments,” Fusion Science and Technology, 44,
388 (2003). 
34. J. P. SHARPE, D. A. PETTI, and H.-W. BARTELS, 
“A review of dust in fusion devices: Implications for 
safety and operational performance,” Fusion 
Engineering and Design, 63-64, 155 (2002). 
35. J. RAPP, P. MONIER-GARBET, and G. F. 
MATTHEWS, “Reduction of divertor heat load in 
JET ELMy H-modes using impurity seeding 
techniques,” Nuclear Fusion, 44, 312 (2004). 
36. S. REYES, J. F. LATKOWSKI, J. GOMEZ DEL 
RIO, and J. SANZ, “Accident Consequences 
Analysis of the HYLIFE-II Inertial Fusion Energy 
Power Plant Design,” Nuclear Instruments and 
Methods in Physics Research A, 464, 416 (2001). 
37. S. REYES, J. F. LATKOWSKI, J. GOMEZ DEL 
RIO, and J. SANZ, "Progress in Accident Analysis of 
the HYLIFE-II Inertial Fusion Energy Power Plant 
Design", Fusion Technology, 39, 946 (2001). 
38. J. F. LATKOWSKI, S. REYES, G. E. 
BESENBRUCH, and D. T. GOODIN, “Preliminary 
Safety Assessment for an IFE Target Fabrication 
Facility,” Fusion Technology, 39, 960 (2001). 
39. E. A. MOGAHED, L. EL-GUEBALY, A. ABDOU, 
P. WILSON, D. HENDERSON and the ARIES 
TEAM, “Loss of Coolant Accident and Loss of Flow 
Accident Analysis of the ARIES-AT Design,” Fusion 
Technology, 39, 462 (2001). 
40. J. SANZ, O. CABELLOS, S. REYES, and J. F. 
LATKOWSKI, “Effect of activation cross-section 
uncertainties in selecting steels for the HYLIFE-II 
chamber to successful waste management,” presented 
at the 23rd Symposium on Fusion Technology (SOFT 
2004), Venice, Italy, 20-24 September, 2004.
41. Clearance levels for radionuclides in solid materials, 
application of exemption principles, interim report 
for comment, IAEA-TECDOC-855, International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna (1996). 
42. D. A. PETTI, K. A. McCARTHY, N. P. TAYLOR, 
C. B. A. FORTY, and R. A. FORREST, “Re-
evaluation of the use of low activation materials in 
waste management strategies for fusion,” Fusion 
Engineering and Design, 51-52, 435 (2000). 
43. L. EL-GUEBALY, D. HENDERSON, A. ABDOU, 
P. WILSON and the ARIES TEAM, “Clearance 
Issues for Advanced Fusion Power Plants,” Fusion 
Technology, 39, 986 (2001). 
44. S. REYES, J. SANZ, and J. F. LATKOWSKI, "Use 
of Clearance Indexes to Assess Waste Disposal 
Issues for the HYLIFE-II Inertial Fusion Energy 
Power Plant Design,” Fusion Engineering and 
Design, 63-64, 257 (2002). 
45. M. C. BILLONE, A. R. RAFFRAY, D.-K. SZE, L. 
EL-GUEBALY and the ARIES TEAM, IFE 
Structural Materials ARIES Assessment, UCSD-
ENG-101, University of California, San Diego 
(2002). 
46. H. Y. KHATER, E. A. MOGAHED, D.-K. SZE, M. 
S. TILLACK, and X. R. WANG, “ARIES-ST safety 
design and analysis,” Fusion Engineering and 
Design, 65, 285 (2003). 
47. T. D. MARSHALL, R. J. PAWELKO, R. A. 
ANDERL, G. R. SMOLIK, B. J. MERRILL, and R. 
L. MOORE, Air Chemical Reactivity Measurements 
of the Carbon Fiber Composite NB31, INEEL/EXT-
02-00745, Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory (2002). 
48 S. REYES, J. F. LATKOWSKI, R. P. ABBOTT, W. 
STEIN, “Simulation of X-Ray Irradiation on Optics 
and Chamber Wall Materials for Inertial Fusion 
Energy,” Proceedings of the Third International 
Conference on Inertial Fusion Sciences and 
Applications (IFSA), American Nuclear Society, 
LaGrange Park, IL, 825 (2003). 
49. D. A. PETTI and B. J. MERRILL, “Future US ITER 
Safety Studies,” these proceedings. 
50. A. C. BELL, P. BALLANTYNE, C. GORDONT, 
and M. A. WRIGHT, "The safety case for JET D-T 
operation," Fusion Engineering and Design, 47, 115 
(1999). 
51. Environmental Assessment, The Tokamak Fusion 
Test Reactor D-T Modifications and Operations,
DOE/EA-0566, US Department of Energy, 
Washington, DC (1992). 
52. J. S. HERRING, C. P. C. WONG, E. T. CHENG, S. 
GROTZ and the ARIES TEAM, “Safety in the 
ARIES tokamak design study,” Proceedings of the 
IEEE 13th Symposium on Fusion Engineering,
October 2-6, 1989, Knoxville, TN, IEEE, 329 (1990). 
53. M. ZUCCHETTI, R. FORREST, C. FORTY, W. 
GULDEN, P. ROCCO, and S. ROSANVALLON, 
“Clearance, recycling and disposal of fusion activated 
material,” Fusion Engineering and Design, 54, 635 
(2001). 
54. J. P. SHARPE, P. W. HUMRICKHOUSE, D. A. 
PETTI, and T. D. MARSHALL, “Dust in ITER: 
R&D Needs for Safety Compliance,” presented at the 
23rd Symposium on Fusion Technology (SOFT 2004),
Venice, Italy, 20-24 September, 2004. 
